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Abstract
We analyze distributional preferences in games in which a decider chooses the pro-
vision of a good that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers.
The average decider takes into account the welfare of all parties and has concerns
for efficiency. However, she attaches similar weights to small and large groups so
that she neglects large provision costs that are dispersed among many payers. This
holds regardless of whether the decider benefits from the provision or not. A CES
utility function which rationalizes average behavior implies altruism in bilateral
situations and welfare-damaging actions when costs are dispersed.
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1 Introduction
In many domains, an agent’s decisions create both benefits for a small, well-defined
group and costs that are dispersed among many individuals. When a politician decides
about a policy that is favored by a special interest group, she has to weigh the benefits
for this group against the costs that the policy creates for the general public. When a
physician determines a patient’s treatment, she affects not only the patient’s well-being,
but also the treatment costs that the insurance company (and hence the customers of
this company) have to pay. Individuals engaged in illegal behaviors such as corruption or
tax evasion typically redistribute income to themselves or their families at the expense
of society.
To analyze these behaviors, we need to know how agents trade-off concentrated benefits
against dispersed costs. Most theoretical work on special interests, physician behavior,
corruption or tax evasion assumes perfectly selfish agents. However, most economists
agree that the assumption of pure selfishness is made only for simplicity. There is
substantial evidence from the lab and the field that a majority of individuals do not act
in completely selfish manner when making decisions that affect the payoff of others.1
One robust finding from the lab is that many individuals take into account the welfare
of all parties and have a preference for efficient outcomes (Andreoni and Miller 2002,
henceforth AM, Charness and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel 2004, Fisman et al.
2007). Nevertheless, it is unclear how social preferences are coined in situations where the
costs of an action are large, but dispersed among many individuals. Does the average
decider then still take into account the welfare of all parties? Or are social concerns
restricted to small groups so that dispersed costs are neglected?
We use a controlled experiment to study preferences in distribution games with concen-
trated benefits and dispersed costs. In each game, a decider chooses the provision of a
good which benefits a receiver, but also creates costs for n payers. The decider may or
may not benefit from the provision of the good. The treatment variation is the number
n of payers; we have n = 1, 3, 6, 40. We keep the costs per payer constant, so that an
increasing number of payers implies increasing costs of provision. If we assume that
subjects are partially motivated by the efficiency of the final outcome, the provision of
the good should decrease in the number of payers.
The experimental data exhibit the following deviation from this prediction. When we
keep the costs per payer constant and increase the number of payers from one to three,
we observe, as expected, a significant drop in the provision of the good. However, if
1See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a review of the evidence from laboratory experiments.
Bandiera et al. (2005) provide field evidence for social concerns at the workplace, and DellaVigna et al.
(2012) for the role of altruism in charitable giving.
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we further increase the number of payers from three to six, and from six to forty, the
average provision of the good remains constant. The average decider takes into account
the payoff of all parties, but large groups of payers seem to receive just the same weight
as small groups. This result holds regardless of whether the decider benefits from the
provision of the good or not.
At the same time, two patterns in our data show that the average cares about efficiency.
First, in dictator games between the decider and the receiver (the decider pays for the
provision of the good, while the payers’ payoff is fixed), the average provision of the good
is larger if the receiver’s marginal benefit exceeds the decider’s marginal costs than if it is
the other way round. Second, in games with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs,
the average provision of the good increases in the receiver’s marginal benefit. Note that
the opposite would be true if subjects were only motivated by selfishness and maximin
preferences.
In order to rationalize these seemingly contradictory results, we develop a parsimonious
social preference model. Specifically, we update the CES utility function that AM use
to estimate preferences in dictator games. This function captures the main behavioral
motives in simple distribution games, i.e., selfishness, efficiency and the welfare of the
least-well off individual. The only new element that we introduce is the weight of a
single payer’s payoff as a function of the number of payers n. We can rationalize our
results if we assume that this function is strictly increasing, concave and converges to
a finite value for n → ∞. A decider with such a utility function takes the welfare of
all parties into account and may increase the provision of the good when the receiver’s
marginal benefit increases (regardless of n). However, she also treats large groups like
small groups so that dispersed costs have little influence on behavior.
Our social preference model produces a number of economic implications. First, it ad-
mits “moral ambiguity”: altruistic behavior in bilateral situations (or small groups) as
well as welfare-damaging behavior in large groups when the costs of an action are dis-
persed among many individuals. Or, to put it in more picturesque terms, both charity
donations to a clearly specified victim and tax evasion can be optimal behaviors for the
average decider. It therefore shows that there is no contradiction between the exper-
imental evidence on pro-social behavior in distribution games and the assumption of
selfish behavior in domains with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. Second, it
implies that insurance coverage matters for medical decision making. Physicians may
recommend an expensive but inessential treatment only to those patients whose insur-
ance company pays for the treatment costs. Third, our social preference model predicts
that altruism is congestible. Donations can be large for a single victim, but may be very
small or zero when they are distributed among many recipients.
Finally, this paper is also related to the current literature on distributive justice that
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asks whether the number n should matter if the welfare of one poor person is traded-off
against the welfare of n rich individuals (e.g., Fleurbaey and Tundgodden 2010, Cowell
et al. 2010, Voorhoeve 2013). The only empirical study in this literature is Cowell et al.
(2010). In a survey, they find that around 50 percent of their subjects think that a poor
person should not suffer from a 1£ cut in her income when this would create a 100 £
gain for each of the n rich persons, regardless how large is n. For the other 50 percent
such a cut is acceptable if n is sufficiently large. In our study, subjects’ decisions have
monetary consequences. Moreover, we vary the decider’s incentives so that we can relate
our results to the previous literature on dictator game giving.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
setup. In Section 3, we present the experimental results. In Section 4, we develop
a social preference model that rationalizes our results. In Section 5, we discuss the
economic implications of this preference model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Basic Set-Up. We adopt the following experimental design to study distributional pref-
erences in games with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. In each “distribution
game”, a single decider D chooses the provision x = 0, 1, ..., 10 of a good, which affects
her own payoff, piD = 15+ax, the payoff of a single receiver R, piR = 5+bx, and the payoff
of n payers Pi, piPi = 15 − cx, with i ∈ {1, ..., n}. The receiver has a lower endowment
than the other parties so that there exists a motive to redistribute payoffs. Parameters
a, b and c vary between treatments and games. In each treatment, the number of payers
n is fixed. We consider four treatments with n equal to one, three, six and forty. We
call these treatments P1, P3, P6, and P40, respectively. Table 1 displays the parameter
values for all treatments and games.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We briefly describe the distribution games that are relevant for our purpose.2 The first
four games in each treatment are simple dictator games (DG) between the decider and
the receiver. In each dictator game, we have a = −1 and c = 0; the parameter b varies
between games. With the dictator games we can test whether subjects’ behavior in our
experiment is comparable to the behavior observed in previous studies on dictator game
2Overall, subjects played twelve distribution games in each treatment. We focus on ten of these
games in the paper. In the other two games (games 5 and 6 in treatments P1, P3, and P6), we keep
the costs per unit provided constant across treatments so that more payers imply lower costs per payer
(see Table 1). The results in these games are in line with the interpretation of our main result.
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giving (Camerer 2003). In addition, we can follow the approach of AM and use the
behavior in these games to classify subjects into different social preference types.
The remaining distribution games have concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. We
are interested in the role of efficiency concerns in these games. Will subjects help the
receiver even if the provision of the good substantially reduces the group payoff, but costs
are distributed among many payers? To what extent do monetary incentives matter for
subjects’ decisions in these situations?
In the games of the treatments P1, P3 and P6, we keep the cost per unit and payer (the
parameter c) constant across treatments. The larger the number of payers, the larger is
the cost per unit. In four of these games, the provision of the good benefits both the
decider and the receiver, but the receiver’s benefit decreases across games. We call these
games “interested cost dispersion games” (ICDG). In each of these games, we have
a = 1.0, c = 1.0; the parameter b varies between games. In the two other games, the
decider has no monetary incentives. We call these games “disinterested cost dispersion
games” (ICDG). There we have a = 0.0, c = 1.0; b again varies between games. By
comparing behavior in the ICDGs and DCDGs we can study the impact of monetary
incentives on behavior in situations with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.
Finally, in the games of the treatment P40, we analyze how subjects trade-off their own
and the receiver’s payoff against the payers’ payoff when the provision of the good be-
comes very costly for the group. For example, in the disinterested cost dispersion games
of the treatments P1 to P6, the negative marginal impact on the group payoff ranges
between zero and −5.5. In comparison, in the treatment P40, the negative marginal
impact goes down to −39.0, which is seven times as large. In the other games of this
treatment, we vary the cost per unit and payer c and whether the decider has a monetary
incentive or not; the parameter b is kept constant.
Experimental Procedures. In a treatment with n payers, subjects are paired up
randomly into groups of size n+ 2. Each subject chooses the provision of the good x in
twelve distribution games (see Table 1). After the experiment (that is after all choices
have been made), we randomly pick one game for each group that is implemented. We
also randomly select one subject from each group that takes on the role of the decider
and one subject that takes on the role of the receiver. The other subjects of the group
take on the role of payers. The decider’s action in the chosen game then determines the
payoffs of all group members. Hence, subjects’ decisions can only affect their own payoff
when they are chosen to be the decider, not when they are in the role of the receiver or
of a payer. This is explicitly communicated to participants.
Our procedure implies that the probability that a decision is implemented equals 1/12×
1/n and therefore decreases in the number of payers. In the dictator (and interested
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cost dispersion games), it is cheaper to make more generous (group payoff maximizing)
choices when there are many payers. We can check for the existence of such demand
effects (Levitt and List 2007) by comparing behavior in the dictator games between
treatments. If a fraction of subjects cares for its reputation of being an altruistic person,
we should observe that the average provision of the good increases in n.
Subjects get no feedback about the actions of others except through their payment after
the experiment. When making their decision, subjects receive detailed information about
the (potential) consequences of their action on the decision screen: their own payoff, the
receiver’s payoff, the payoff of each payer, and the group payoff.
The experiment was conducted over the internet and administered by CentERdata,
Tilburg University. We obtained the data in anonymized form (this was made clear
to participants in the invitation e-mails and on the first screen of the experiment). We
recruited 383 subjects through ORSEE (Greiner 2004) from the subject pool of the
Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA). Par-
ticipants were students of all faculties of the University of Munich. 98 subjects were
randomly assigned to treatment P1, 101 to treatment P3, 91 to treatment P6 and 93
to treatment P40. On the first screens of the experiment, participants answered several
survey questions on demographic variables. We then carefully explained the design using
several numerical examples. Subjects could participate in the experiment only if they
correctly answered two control questions. Access to the experiment was open for two
weeks. Payments were made one week after the experiment. A participant’s payoff of pi
tokens was converted into 0.5pi EUR. Average earnings (which include a 4 EUR show-up
fee) were 10.06 EUR.
Conjectures. Previous studies have shown that the dominant behavioral motives in
simple distribution games are selfishness, efficiency and the maximization of the payoff
of the least well-off individual. In the following, we assume that subjects care about
these motives.
Consider any dictator game. The marginal effect of the provision of the good on the
decider’s payoff and the group payoff is constant across treatments. Also the minmax
action (the number x of units that must be provided in order to maximize the welfare of
the least well-off individual) does not depend on the number of payers. Hence, if subjects
only care about the effect of their action on their own payoff, the group payoff and the
payoff of the least well-off individual, the provision of the good in the dictator games is
independent of the number of payers.
Consider any cost dispersion game (ICDG or DCDG). When we vary the number of
payers, the marginal effect of the provision of the good on the decider’s payoff and the
minmax action remain constant. However, the marginal effect of the provision of the
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good on the group payoff decreases in the number of payers. Thus, we expect that
concerns for efficiency decrease the provision of the good when the number of payers
increases.
CONJECTURE 1: In the dictator games, the provision of the good is independent of the
number of payers.
CONJECTURE 2: In the cost dispersion games, the provision of the good decreases in
the number of payers.
Finally, the variation of the receiver’s marginal benefit b in each class of games allows
us to check within-subject which motive is on average the stronger one: concerns for
efficiency or for the least well-off individual. If efficiency concerns are stronger than
concerns for the least well-off individual, the provision of the good should increase in b
(and vice versa).
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Average Behavior in the Dictator Games
We use the dictator games to control for two important issues. First, we check whether
dictator game giving in each treatment is comparable to that reported in previous studies.
Second, we observe whether the varying probability that a decision becomes implemented
changes subjects’ behavior through demand effects. Figure 1 shows the average amounts
provided in each treatment and dictator game. One third of our subjects are purely self-
ish and provide 0 units in all dictator games. Over all parameter values and treatments,
subjects provided on average 20.4 percent of the maximum possible amount. Hence,
average behavior is very similar to typical mean allocations in the studies reported by
Camerer (2003). In games 1 and 2, the average provision is 2.43 and 2.47 units, re-
spectively; in games 3 and 4, the average provision is 1.61 and 1.63 units, respectively.
Subjects’ average reaction to the price of giving is close to the one reported in AM.3
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3If the relative price of giving (in our case −a/b) equals 2, 1, and 0.5, the average provision in AM is
20.7-21.2, 16.9-24.3 and 30.3-32.3 percent, respectively (see Table 1 in AM). In our data, if the relative
price of giving equals 2, 1.11 and 0.5 the average provision is 16.3, 16.1 and 24.3 percent, respectively.
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The number of payers has no influence on subjects’ decisions. A non-parametric rank-
sum test does not reject the equality of the distributions of provisions by n in pairwise
comparisons (p-values lie between 0.55 and 0.99). Table 2 confirms this result in a linear
regression. We regress the number of units provided on the number of payers n, the
receiver’s marginal benefit b and gender. Standard errors are clustered by subject. The
number of payers has no significant influence on the provision of the good. Also, subjects
do not react differently to changes in b when n changes (see the interaction terms between
b and n in the second specification). This confirms Conjecture 1 and shows that there
are no demand effects in our experiment.
Like Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) we find a significant gender-effect, see specification
3 of Table 2. Men provide more of the good than women if the provision of the good
increases the group payoff, and less if it decreases the group payoff.
Following AM, we use behavior in the dictator games to classify subjects into selfish,
maximin and efficiency types according to the smallest Euclidean (mean square) distance
between their choices and the prediction of the pure types.4 We thereby get a coarse
estimate about their dominant behavioral motive in distribution games. Of course, a
subject may care for more than one of these motives. Therefore, we also look at average
behavior independent of the type. However, as we will see the classification will facilitate
the interpretation of the subsequent results.
Over all treatments, 60.6 percent of subjects are classified as selfish, 31.5 percent as
maximin, and 7.9 percent as efficiency types. The corresponding numbers in AM are
47.2, 30.4 and 22.4 percent, respectively. We have a somewhat larger share of selfish and
fewer efficiency types compared to AM, which may be due to the fact that subjects in
our experiment were recruited from all faculties while AM had only economics students.
Fehr et al. (2006) show that economics students have a higher preference for efficiency.
The distribution over types in our sample is almost identical across treatments.5
3.2 The impact of cost dispersion on behavior
To what extent do subjects reduce the provision of the good when its costs increase while
the costs per payer remain constant? Subjects who are motived exclusively by selfishness
and/or maximin preferences should provide the same amount in all conditions. However,
4The utility function of the purely selfish type is given by U(piD, piR, piP ) = piD, that of the
pure maximin type by U(piD, piR, piP ) = min{piD, piR, piP }, and that of the pure efficiency type by
U(piD, piR, piP ) = piD + piR +PpiP . In the four dictator games, the selfish type always provides zero, the
maximin type provides 3-4/4/5-6/6-7, and the efficiency type provides 10/10/0/0, respectively.
5The share of (weak) selfish types in a given treatment varies between 58.2 and 62.2 percent, the
share of (weak) maximin types varies between 28.9 and 36.3 percent, and the share of (weak) efficiency
types varies between 5.5 and 9.0 percent, see Table 6 in the Appendix for details.
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subjects who are partially motivated by efficiency should reduce the provision of the good
when more payers are affected by its costs. Hence, for the cost dispersion games we expect
that average provision decreases in the number of payers. In particular, this should be
true in the disinterested cost dispersion games where making choices that maximize the
group payoff is costless for the decider.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Figure 2 shows the average amounts provided in the interested cost dispersion games.
When the number of payers increases from one to three, the average amount provided
drops by around 25 percent. In a linear regression, this effect is significant for all games
at the 1 percent level (see Table 3). However, when we further increase the number of
payers from three to six, the average amount provided remains largely constant. The
coefficients of P3 and P6 are not statistically different. Apparently, aggregate behavior
becomes unresponsive to increasing costs of provision when the costs per payer remain
constant. This result holds if we further increase the number of payers. The average
provision in game 7 with six payers is 5.83. In the corresponding game with 40 payers,
the average provision is 5.68.6 Thus, although there are many more payers affected, the
provision of the good is essentially the same (when we test for equality of coefficients,
the p-value is 0.784). The implied average damage for the group payoff is substantial.
In treatment P40, for example, the decider and the receiver each gain on average 5.69
tokens through the provision of the good, while the group payoff decreases by 216.22
tokens.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Figure 3 shows the average provision in the disinterested cost dispersion games. When
the number of payers increases from one to three, the average amount provided drops by
around 33 percent. In a linear regression, this effect is significant at a 1 percent level (see
Table 4). When we further increase the number of payers from three to six, the average
amount provided again remains constant. The same holds if we increase the number of
payers to 40. When b = 1.0 and c = 1.0, the average provision is equal to 3.32 with six
payers and equal to 3.40 with 40 payers. Hence, even if it is costless for the decider to
make choices that maximize group welfare, subjects become unresponsive to increasing
costs of provision when the costs per payer remain constant.
6In the corresponding game P40.5, parameters are identical to game P6.7 except that b is equal to
1.0 in the former and 0.8 in the latter.
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OBSERVATION. Average behavior becomes unresponsive to an increase in provision
costs when the costs per payer remain constant. This rejects Conjecture 2. The result
holds independent of whether the provision benefits the decider or not.
Can we conclude that our subjects do not care for efficiency? The answer is no. In
all types of games of the treatments P1, P3 and P6, we vary b, the receiver’s payoff
per unit provided. A larger b implies that the provision of the good is less harmful for
the group payoff. Efficiency concerns then increase the provision of the good when b
increases. Concerns for the least well-off individual decrease the provision of the good
when b increases. The data imply that the first effect dominates. The provision of the
good significantly increases in b (see Tables 2 to 4). Hence, the average decider takes into
account the payoff of all parties and has concerns for efficiency when she trades-off the
welfare of one individual against the welfare of another individual. However, large groups
of payers receive just the same weight as small groups. Consequently, the provision of
the good under dispersed costs is substantial even if provision costs become very large.
We obtain further information about the behavioral motives that lead to this result if we
compare the average behavior of the three preference types. Consider first the average
provision in the interested cost dispersion games (with a = 1.0; b = 0.8 in P1, P3 and
P6; b = 1.0 in P40; c = 1.0):
P1.7 P3.7 P6.7 P40.5
Selfish: 8.17 7.26 6.96 6.49
Maximin: 6.00 4.38 4.62 4.70
Efficiency: 9.63 2.33 2.63 3.60
Selfish types on average reduce the provision of the good as the number of payers in-
creases, but at a decreasing rate. For the first two additional payers, provision decreases
by 11.1 percent, while for the last 34 additional payers provision decreases by only 6.8
percent. Obviously, they care about the group payoff to some extent, but they do not
reduce the provision of the good to low levels if the costs of provision become very large.
Maximin types reduce the provision of the good on average by 27.0 percent for the first
two additional payers, but then become unresponsive to further changes (which is exactly
what we would expect given their dominant behavioral motive). Efficiency types reduce
the provision of the good to low levels once it reduces the group payoff (again, this is
the expected outcome). Differences in means are significant for the first two additional
payers for all types (p-values for one-sided t-tests ≤ 0.0518), while there are no statisti-
cally significant differences for the increases from three to six or 40 payers (p-values ≥
0.2504).
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A similar picture obtains if we consider the disinterested cost dispersion games (with
a = 0.0; b = 1.0; c = 1.0):
P1.11 P3.11 P6.11 P40.10
Selfish: 4.88 3.52 3.32 2.94
Maximin: 5.00 3.69 4.42 4.61
Efficiency: 5.63 0.56 0.13 1.60
Selfish types again respond to growing costs at a decreasing pace: For the first two
additional payers, provision decreases by 27.9 percent (p-value = 0.004), while for the
last 34 payers provision only decreases by 11.4 percent (p-value = 0.267). So even if is
costless to make choices that maximize the group payoff, selfish types become insensitive
to increasing provision costs as long as the costs per payer remain constant. For maximin
types, it hardly makes a difference whether the number of payers is one or 40. Efficiency
types drastically reduce the provision of the good once it decreases the group payoff.
4 Rationalizing Behavior with CES-Preferences
We develop a parsimonious social preference model that can rationalize our experimental
data. In particular, it will describe why the average decider has concerns for efficiency
when it comes to trade-offs between the welfare of two individuals, and at the same time
neglects large provision costs when they are dispersed among many payers. In the next
section, we apply our social preference model to a number of economic decisions where
distributional preferences matter.
The model has to capture the following observations: (a) giving in dictator games is
strictly positive and independent of the number of payers; (b) the provision of the good
decreases if we increase the number of payers from one to three, but (c) converges to a
positive value if we further increase the number of payers; (d) the provision of the good
increases in b, regardless of the number of payers.
AM rationalize the behavior of the three preference types in dictator games with the
following CES-utility function:
UAM(piD, piR) = (αpiρD + (1− α)piρR)1/ρ .
It provides a good fit for all preference types. The parameter α represents the weight of
the own payoff relative to the payoff of others; the parameter ρ defines the convexity of
the utility function. For the three preference types, AM estimate α in the range between
0.5 and 0.8, and ρ in the range between -0.4 and 0.7. We generalize AM’s utility function
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to a setting with three parties where one party may consist of several individuals:
U(piD, piR, piP ) =
(
α
f(n)pi
ρ
D +
0.5(1− α)
f(n) pi
ρ
R +
(
1− α
f(n) −
0.5(1− α)
f(n)
)
piρP
)1/ρ
.
Compared to UAM our utility function U contains one more object, f(n). It captures the
weight on a payer’s payoff versus the own and the receiver’s payoff as a function of the
number of payers. We normalize f(0) = 0.5(1+α) so that for n = 0 our utility function
U collapses to a linear transformation of UAM . Moreover, we set f(1) = 1 so that for
n = 1 the receiver’s and a payer’s payoff have the same weight in the utility function
(note that the second term in U is multiplied by 0.5).
We show that if α < 1, 0 < ρ < 1 and f is a weakly increasing function with f(40) ≈
f(6) ≈ f(3) > 1, then a decider with utility function U exhibits the behaviors (a) to (d).
Recall that in each game piD = 15+ ax, piR = 5+ bx, piP = 15− cx. For convenience, we
treat x ∈ [0, 10] as a continuous variable. We abbreviate U(x) = V (x)1/ρ. The first-order
derivative is then
U ′(x) = V (x)1/ρ−1 αa
f(n)pi
ρ−1
D + V (x)1/ρ−1
0.5(1− α)b
f(n) pi
ρ−1
R
−V (x)1/ρ−1
(
1− α
f(n) −
0.5(1− α)
f(n)
)
cpiρ−1P .
For all games, an interior optimum is characterized by the implicit function
αapiρ−1D + 0.5(1− α)bpiρ−1R − (f(n)− α− 0.5(1− α)) cpiρ−1P = 0. (1)
We prove property (a). In each dictator game, we have a < 0, b > 0 and c = 0. Since
ρ < 1, the first and second term in (1) strictly decrease in x, while the third term equals
0. Hence, there is a unique optimum, which is independent of n and strictly positive if
α is not too close to 1.
We prove property (b) and (c). In each game that is not a dictator game, we have a ≥ 0,
b > 0 and c > 0. Since ρ < 1, the first term in (1) equals 0 or strictly decreases in
x, the second term strictly decreases in x, and the third term strictly increases in x.
Consequently, there is a unique optimum in each cost dispersion game. Property (b)
directly follows from the assumption that f(1) = 1 < f(3), and property (c) from the
assumption that f(3) ≈ f(6) ≈ f(40).
We prove property (d). From the implicit function we get
dx
db
= (1− ρ)
−10.5(1− α)piρ−1R (1− (1− ρ)bxpi−1R )
αa2piρ−2D + 0.5(1− α)b2piρ−2R + (f(n)− α− 0.5(1− α))c2piρ−2P
.
Since alpha < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1, this expression is strictly positive. Hence, the optimal
action in each game increases in b.
11
The important feature of utility function U is that it captures distributional preferences
in small and large groups. All important behavioral motivations that we observe in the
distribution games — selfishness, efficiency, and concerns for the least well-off individual
— can be active in U independent of group size. However, if we assume that the weight
on the payers’s payoff converges to a fixed value, i.e., limn→∞ f(n) = f < ∞, then
large groups receive the same weight as small groups. Consequently, large costs that
are dispersed among many individuals have relatively little influence on behavior. In
the next section, we discuss the economic implications of our preference model on social
behavior, medical decision making and charity donations.
5 Economic Implications
Moral ambiguity. Our utility function U suggests that both pro- and asocial acts can
be optimal at the same time for the average decider. Take, for example, donations x ≥ 0
to a clearly specified, needy receiver and tax evasion z ≥ 0. The decider maximizes utility
from both activities, possibly at different points in time and with a different mindset,
but with the same distributional preferences. A donation is a transfer of x from the
decider to some receiver. The monetary gain of tax evasion for the decider is z and the
cost of tax evasion per (tax-)payer is z
n
. Let piD, piR and piP be the initial endowments
of the decider, receiver and each payer, respectively. The decider will donate a positive
amount to the receiver if at x = 0
∂
∂x
[
α
f(n)(piD − x)
ρ
]
+ ∂
∂x
[
0.5(1− α)
f(n) (piR + x)
ρ
]
> 0,
which is the case when
−αpiρ−1D + 0.5(1− α)piρ−1R > 0.
This condition holds for α < 1 if the receiver is sufficiently poor relative to the decider.
However, the decider will also evade taxes if at z = 0
∂
∂z
[
α
f(n)(piD + z)
ρ
]
+ ∂
∂z
[(
1− α
f(n) −
0.5(1− α)
f(n)
)(
piP − z
n
)ρ]
> 0.
Since f(n) is an increasing function that converges to f <∞, this inequality is implied
by
αpiρ−1D +
1
n
(f − α− 0.5(1− α))piρ−1P > 0.
The second term on the left-hand side vanishes for n→∞. The decider hides a positive
amount of her income if the costs of tax evasion are dispersed among sufficiently many
payers. So the optimal levels of donations and tax evasion can be strictly positive at the
same time. A similar case can be made for corruption or the provision of local public
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goods at the expense of a national tax base. For economic theory this means that in
domains with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs, the assumption of selfishness is
a good approximation of the average decider’s utilitarian preferences.
Concerns for the patient, not for insurance holders. The idea that physicians
have concerns for the patient is well-established in the health economics literature (see
McGuire 2000, Chapter 6, for a review). There is, however, no consensus how to model
them. Several papers assume that physicians’ utility function is given by U(piD, piR),
where piD is their own income and piR the patient’s welfare. There are no concerns for
the welfare of insurance payers.
Physicians’ distributional preferences matter a lot for efficiency in the health care sector.
Chandra and Skinner (2012) show in a model of patient demand and health-care supply
behavior that the availability of treatments that are on average ineffective create rapid
cost growth when patients are fully insured. The key assumption in their analysis is that
physicians “want to do everything in their power to cure their patient.” Consequently,
there is positive supply of treatments with small benefits for the patient, but large costs
for insurance holders.
Our social preference model qualifies the assumption that there are concerns for the
patient, but not for insurance payers. In the model, the decider takes the welfare of all
parties into account and has concerns for efficiency, but gives very little weight to costs
that are dispersed among many individuals.
One consequence of this is that insurance protection changes physicians’ behavior. Con-
sider a physician who decides whether a treatment should take place (x = 1) or not
(x = 0). Her distributional preferences are given by our utility function U . The treat-
ment benefits the patient, but it is not essential for her recovery. The patient has no
information about the benefits and costs of the treatment. She therefore relies on the
physician’s recommendations. Let the physician’s remuneration be ax, the patient’s net
benefit (in monetary terms) bx, and the costs are cx, where a, b, c are positive. Initial
endowments are again given by piD, piR and piP (we assume that piR, piP > c). Either
the patient or her insurance company pay for the costs of treatment. Suppose that the
treatment is inefficient in the sense that a + b << c. Will the physician perform the
treatment or not?
Assume first that the physician is motivated only by economic self-interest (α = 1).
She will then perform the treatment, regardless of whether the patient or an insurance
company pays for it. Insurance protection creates no additional costs.
Now assume that the physician takes the welfare of other parties into account (α < 1).
13
She will not perform the treatment in the case of no insurance protection if
α [(piD + a)ρ − piρD] < 0.5(1− α) [piρR − (piR + b− c)ρ] ,
which holds if concerns for others’ welfare are sufficiently strong (α is not too close to
1). In the case of full insurance, the physician will perform the treatment if
α [(piD + a)ρ − piρD] + 0.5(1− α) [(piR + b)ρ − piρR]
> (f(n)− α− 0.5(1− α))
[
piρP −
(
piP − c
n
)ρ]
.
Since f(n) converges to f , the right-hand side converges to 0 as n becomes large. So
the physician will perform the treatment if the costs are dispersed among sufficiently
many customers of the insurance company. Insurance protection then decreases welfare
by c− a− b >> 0.
Note that these costs of insurance are different from those created by moral hazard.
Moral hazard causes costs because the insurance holder (or the physician) exploits a
situation of asymmetric information. Our costs of insurance occur because one party
(the physician) weights differently the welfare of a single individual (the patient) and
the welfare of a party that consists of many individuals (insurance holders).
The empirical evidence on physician choices suggests that insured patients (or patients
with better insurance coverage) are more likely to receive high-cost treatments than those
without insurance (or less extensive coverage), controlling for other factors that influence
physicians’ decisions. An early study by Mort et al. (1996) is based on a large number of
hypothetical treatment decisions elicited in a nationally representative survey of physi-
cians. McKinlay et al. (1996) use a videotape study to analyze the influence of several
socio-economic variables on physicians’ decisions. They find that in the subsample of old
patients insured ones were more likely to get a cardiac diagnosis for chest pain, which
creates greater subsequent costs than the gastrointestinal or psychogenic alternatives.
There is also more recent evidence along these lines from administrative data on actual
treatment decisions: U.S. data show that Caesarian sections are more likely performed
on privately insured mothers than on those without insurance (Movsas et al. 2012), and
brand-name drugs are less often substituted for with generic drugs for patients with more
lower co-payments for branded drugs in Switzerland (Rischatsch et al. 2013). An impli-
cation of these studies is that physicians show more concern for an individual patient’s
financial situation than for the cost borne by an insurance firm or the tax-payer. To the
extent that many Cesarians are not necessary from a purely medical point of view, and
that generics and brand-name drugs provide comparable health benefits (even though
they might provide higher utility to the patient), these empirical observations imply that
the existence of health insurance leads to a welfare loss. At the core of the problem are
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physicians who do not fully take into account treatment costs borne by the health in-
surance system, i.e., who have the type of preference that we are concerned with in this
paper. This may be an important reason for why the spread of health insurance through
Medicare has increased medical spending dramatically in the United States (Finkelstein
2007).
Congestible altruism. Our social preference theory predicts that charity donations
to a single individual will exceed those to a large group of individuals. For the decider,
making a donation to a single recipient is rational as long as
−αpiρ−1D + 0.5(1− α)piρ−1R ≥ 0,
while making a donation of x/n to n recipients is only rational as long as
−αpiρ−1D +
1
n
(f(n)− α− 0.5(1− α))piρ−1R ≥ 0.
Hence, for any given α the decider will give nothing if n is sufficiently large. This implies
that it may be important for charity organizations to highlight the fate of one specific
recipient that depends on the giver’s benevolence.
There is some experimental evidence that altruism depends on the number of recipients.
Kogut and Ritov (2005) find that contributions for a single victim exceed those for a
group of eight victims when these two situations are judged separately. Andreoni (2007)
studies how donations depend on the number of receivers. He finds partial congestion:
when the number of receivers doubles (and each receiver gets a constant amount per
unit provided), the value of a donation to the giver increases by a factor less than two.
Specifically, he estimates that one person receiving x is equivalent to n persons receiving
x/nβ where β = 0.68. This means that if we keep constant the marginal effect of a
donation on a single recipient, donations increase in n, but at a decreasing rate.
In our social preference model, if limn→∞ f(n) = f < ∞, altruism is a fully congestible
good. Since large groups receive the same weight as small groups, increasing the number
of receivers (while keeping fixed the marginal effect per receiver) will not increase dona-
tions when there are already many receivers. So in our case, the parameter β would be
rather close to 0 for n ≥ 3.7
7We conjecture that this effect occurs in our experiment, because the group size is not made salient to
subjects. In contrast, subjects make decisions for varying group-sizes in Andreoni’s (2007) experiment.
In their desire to behave consistently, subjects may increase donations in response to an increasing
number of receivers. However, note that in the domain of charity donations the the number of receivers
(or a variation in the number of receivers) is usually not a salient issue.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied distributional preferences in games with concentrated benefits
and dispersed costs. We find that the average decider takes into account the payoff of
all parties and has efficiency concerns when she trades-off the payoff of two individuals.
However, she attaches similar weights to small and large groups of payers. Hence, she
neglects large costs that are dispersed among many individuals and therefore provides a
good even if if this substantially reduces the total group payoff. This result is indepen-
dent of whether the decider benefits from the provision of the good or not. We created a
social preference model that explains average behavior both in simple dictator games and
our cost dispersion games. It can generate pro-social actions in small groups as well as
welfare-damaging behavior in situations with concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.
In models of health care provision, local public goods, corruption and tax evasion, the
assumption of agents who do not care for societal welfare is therefore a good approxima-
tion of actual utilitarian preferences and does not conflict with the experimental evidence
on other-regarding motivations.
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TABLE 1 - Payoff Parameters
Number Marginal Impact
Payoff Parameters of Payers on Group Payoff
Game Label a b c n a+ b− nc
P1.1 DG -1.0 2.0 0.0 1 1.0
P1.2 DG -1.0 1.5 0.0 1 0.5
P1.3 DG -1.0 0.9 0.0 1 -0.1
P1.4 DG -1.0 0.5 0.0 1 -0.5
P1.5 CD 0.5 0.3 1.5 1 -0.7
P1.6 CD 0.5 0.1 1.5 1 -0.9
P1.7 ICDG 1.0 0.8 1.0 1 0.8
P1.8 ICDG 1.0 0.5 1.0 1 0.5
P1.9 ICDG 1.0 0.3 1.0 1 0.3
P1.10 ICDG 1.0 0.1 1.0 1 0.1
P1.11 DCDG 0.0 1.0 1.0 1 0.0
P1.12 DCDG 0.0 0.5 1.0 1 -0.5
P3.1 DG -1.0 2.0 0.0 3 1.0
P3.2 DG -1.0 1.5 0.0 3 0.5
P3.3 DG -1.0 0.9 0.0 3 -0.1
P3.4 DG -1.0 0.5 0.0 3 -0.5
P3.5 CD 0.5 0.3 0.5 3 -0.7
P3.6 CD 0.5 0.1 0.5 3 -0.9
P3.7 ICDG 1.0 0.8 1.0 3 -1.2
P3.8 ICDG 1.0 0.5 1.0 3 -1.5
P3.9 ICDG 1.0 0.3 1.0 3 -1.7
P3.10 ICDG 1.0 0.1 1.0 3 -1.9
P3.11 DCDG 0.0 1.0 1.0 3 -2.0
P3.12 DCDG 0.0 0.5 1.0 3 -2.5
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TABLE 1 Continued - Payoff Parameters
Number Marginal Impact
Payoff Parameters of Payers on Group Payoff
Game Label a b c n a+ b− nc
P6.1 DG -1.0 2.0 0.0 6 1.0
P6.2 DG -1.0 1.5 0.0 6 0.5
P6.3 DG -1.0 0.9 0.0 6 -0.1
P6.4 DG -1.0 0.5 0.0 6 -0.5
P6.5 CD 0.5 0.3 0.25 6 -0.7
P6.6 CD 0.5 0.1 0.25 6 -0.9
P6.7 ICDG 1.0 0.8 1.0 6 -4.2
P6.8 ICDG 1.0 0.5 1.0 6 -4.5
P6.9 ICDG 1.0 0.3 1.0 6 -4.7
P6.10 ICDG 1.0 0.1 1.0 6 -4.9
P6.11 DCDG 0.0 1.0 1.0 6 -5.0
P6.12 DCDG 0.0 0.5 1.0 6 -5.5
P40.1 DG -1.0 2.0 0.0 40 1.0
P40.2 DG -1.0 1.5 0.0 40 0.5
P40.3 DG -1.0 0.9 0.0 40 -0.1
P40.4 DG -1.0 0.5 0.0 40 -0.5
P40.5 ICDG 1.0 1.0 1.0 40 -38.0
P40.6 ICDG 1.0 1.0 0.8 40 -30.0
P40.7 ICDG 1.0 1.0 0.6 40 -22.0
P40.8 ICDG 1.0 1.0 0.4 40 -14.0
P40.9 ICDG 1.0 1.0 0.2 40 -6.0
P40.10 DCDG 0.0 1.0 1.0 40 -39.0
P40.11 DCDG 0.0 1.0 0.5 40 -19.0
P40.12 DCDG 0.0 1.0 0.1 40 -3.0
Note: Games P1.5, P1.6, P3.5, P3.6, P6.5, and P6.6 are not considered in this paper.
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TABLE 2 - Behavior in dictator games
Games 1-4, all treatments
Dependent variable: units provided (1) (2) (3)
b 0.656*** 0.648*** 0.224*
[0.117] [0.231] [0.121]
P3 -0.143 -0.234 0.185
[0.278] [0.409] [0.398]
P6 -0.019 -0.097 0.173
[0.309] [0.440] [0.400]
P42 -0.052 0.079 0.581
[0.293] [0.446] [0.414]
Male 0.086 0.086 -0.470
[0.211] [0.211] [0.455]
b*male 0.905***
[0.234]
P3*male -0.615
[0.554]
P6*male -0.289
[0.630]
P40*male -1.323**
[0.577]
b*P3 0.075
[0.321]
b*P6 0.064
[0.336]
b*P40 -0.107
[0.331]
Constant 1.245*** 1.256*** 1.481***
[0.267] [0.308] [0.285]
Observations 1,532 1,532 1,532
R2 0.021 0.021 0.039
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustering of standard errors by respondent
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 3 - Behavior in interested cost dispersion games
Games 7-10, treatments P1, P3 and P6
Dependent variable: units provided (1) (2) (3)
b 0.975*** 0.980** 0.791***
[0.201] [0.388] [0.267]
P3 -1.866*** -1.911*** -2.293***
[0.433] [0.519] [0.565]
P6 -2.020*** -1.962*** -1.956***
[0.489] [0.565] [0.607]
b*male 0.377
[0.404]
P3*male 0.791
[0.855]
P6*male -0.243
[1.007]
Male -0.464 -0.464 -0.830
[0.397] [0.397] [0.572]
b*P3 0.107
[0.513]
b*P6 -0.135
[0.500]
Constant 7.281*** 7.279*** 7.468***
[0.348] [0.384] [0.383]
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,160
R2 0.068 0.068 0.072
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by respondent
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4 - Behavior in disinterested cost dispersion games
Games 11-12, treatments P1, P3 and P6
Dependent variable: units provided (1) (2) (3)
b 0.807*** 1.204* 0.770*
[0.306] [0.619] [0.397]
P3 -1.562*** -1.149 -1.076**
[0.346] [0.744] [0.536]
P6 -1.625*** -1.134 -1.040*
[0.381] [0.741] [0.560]
b*male 0.075
[0.616]
P3*male -0.911
[0.698]
P6*male -1.257*
[0.750]
Male -0.878*** -0.878*** -0.232
[0.302] [0.303] [0.723]
b*P3 -0.551
[0.800]
b*P6 -0.655
[0.758]
Constant 4.539*** 4.242*** 4.194***
[0.406] [0.604] [0.512]
Observations 580 580 580
R2 0.084 0.085 0.091
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by respondent
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix
TABLE 5 - Variable Definitions
Variable Range Definition
a {-1;0;0.5;1} Cost/benefit (per unit x of the good) accru-
ing to the decider
b {0.1;0.3;0.5;0.9;1.5;2.0} Benefit (per unit x of the good) accruing to
the receiver
c {0;0.1;0.2;0.25;0.4;0.6;0.8;1.0} Cost (per unit x of the good) accruing to each
of the payers
P1 {0;1} Dummy indicating that subject was ran-
domly assigned to a group of 1 payer
P3 {0;1} Dummy indicating that subject was ran-
domly assigned to a group of 3 payers
P6 {0;1} Dummy indicating that subject was ran-
domly assigned to a group of 6 payers
P40 {0;1} Dummy indicating that subject was ran-
domly assigned to a group of 40 payers
Male {0;1} Dummy indicating that respondent is male
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TABLE 6 - Average behavior of selfish, maximin and efficiency types
All Selfish Maximin Efficiency
Game av sd av sd av sd av sd
N = 98 N = 58 (59,8%) N = 31 (32,0%) N = 8 (8,2%)
P1.1 2.43 2.96 0.79 1.50 3.90 2.04 8.88 2.23
P1.2 2.63 3.05 0.72 1.20 4.19 1.80 9.50 0.93
P1.3 1.61 2.11 0.45 0.94 3.90 1.30 1.38 3.50
P1.4 1.70 2.39 0.43 1.09 4.35 2.21 0.88 1.64
P1.5 5.16 3.97 6.41 4.10 3.71 2.73 1.13 2.23
P1.6 5.03 4.07 6.41 4.15 3.29 2.70 1.13 2.80
P1.7 7.62 2.78 8.17 2.80 6.00 2.31 9.63 1.06
P1.8 7.82 2.70 8.52 2.55 6.13 2.50 9.00 1.41
P1.9 7.42 2.95 8.19 2.72 5.45 2.66 9.13 1.81
P1.10 6.94 3.52 7.78 3.13 5.06 3.60 7.75 3.58
P1.11 4.98 2.30 4.88 2.45 5.00 1.79 5.63 3.20
P1.12 4.38 3.11 4.36 3.41 4.81 2.15 3.38 3.89
N = 101 N = 62 (62,0%) N = 29 (29,0%) N = 9 (9,0%)
P3.1 2.36 2.91 0.74 1.27 3.93 1.83 8.67 2.69
P3.2 2.46 2.86 0.74 1.24 4.07 1.36 8.22 2.68
P3.3 1.54 2.07 0.48 1.00 4.34 1.26 0.00 0.00
P3.4 1.46 2.26 0.42 0.95 4.17 2.35 0.00 0.00
P3.5 0.33 3.55 7.23 3.41 5.86 2.66 1.22 2.44
P3.6 5.80 3.93 6.87 3.74 5.07 3.54 1.44 2.40
P3.7 5.92 3.55 7.26 3.27 4.38 2.44 2.33 3.74
P3.8 5.80 3.93 7.23 3.13 4.00 2.63 2.44 3.47
P3.9 5.38 3.62 6.85 3.33 3.66 2.74 1.33 1.80
P3.10 5.21 3.90 6.84 3.56 3.03 2.77 1.56 3.32
P3.11 3.27 2.91 3.52 2.98 3.69 2.65 0.56 1.67
P3.12 2.94 2.96 2.98 3.11 3.66 2.58 0.67 2.00
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TABLE 6 (Cont’d) - Average behavior of selfish, maximin and efficiency types
All Selfish Maximin Efficiency
Game av sd av sd av sd av sd
N = 91 N = 56 (62,2%) N = 26 (28,9%) N = 8 (8,9%)
P6.1 2.54 3.01 0.86 1.15 3.88 2.21 9.63 1.06
P6.2 2.43 2.86 0.71 1.16 3.92 1.09 9.25 2.12
P6.3 1.69 2.36 0.25 0.55 4.69 1.23 2.25 3.65
P6.4 1.59 2.53 0.27 0.70 4.73 2.57 0.88 1.81
P6.5 6.53 3.93 7.11 3.65 6.42 3.73 3.63 5.01
P6.6 6.38 4.12 7.41 3.60 5.85 4.22 1.75 3.62
P6.7 5.84 3.91 6.96 3.73 4.62 3.10 2.63 4.57
P6.8 5.46 3.97 6.73 3.92 3.96 2.76 2.13 4.02
P6.9 5.52 4.14 6.93 3.90 3.81 3.37 1.88 3.72
P6.10 5.18 4.24 6.52 4.09 3.46 3.49 2.00 3.85
P6.11 3.32 3.01 3.32 3.10 4.42 2.55 0.13 0.35
P6.12 3.04 3.20 2.79 3.13 4.65 3.02 0.00 0.00
N = 93 N = 53 (58,2%) N = 33 (36,3%) N = 5 (5,5%)
P40.1 2.41 2.88 0.81 1.37 3.61 2.15 9.8. 0.45
P40.2 2.35 2.64 0.79 1.34 3.88 1.78 9.00 1.73
P40.3 1.60 2.24 0.15 0.46 4.12 1.80 1.00 2.24
P40.4 1.77 2.66 0.17 0.51 4.61 2.62 0.20 0.45
P40.5 5.69 3.32 6.49 3.59 4.70 2.31 3.60 4.16
P40.6 5.97 3.17 6.79 3.35 4.91 2.38 4.60 4.45
P40.7 6.33 3.35 7.47 3.24 5.09 2.69 3.00 4.24
P40.8 7.22 3.15 8.26 2.78 5.82 2.88 5.40 5.08
P40.9 8.12 2.85 8.75 2.52 7.15 2.98 7.40 4.34
P40.10 3.40 3.02 2.94 3.23 4.61 2.32 1.60 2.61
P40.11 3.91 3.28 3.47 3.41 4.97 2.90 3.20 2.95
P40.12 6.30 4.01 5.91 4.08 7.30 3.64 5.40 5.08
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